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I. Introduction
The standard literature lists three ways in which the Western
industrialised countries could support the transformation process
in Europe's emerging market economies (EMEs): technical
assistance, financial aid and trade access (see i.a. World Bank
1991, p. iv) . Important as such support would be, it may not
suffice. This paper adresses the question whether the West could
make a further major contribution: lending institutional
stability to the EMEs. The starting point is the observation that
an institutional deficiency or even void is one of the major
causes of the transformation crisis. ' The old institutions have
largely vanished; the emergence and consolidation of new and
ultimately far superior institutional arrangements takes time;
the nascent local institutions lack stability and credibility.
Whereas the issues of credibility and institutional stability
have featured prominently in the debate on some internal aspects
of the transformation process, they have played no major role in
the discussion on how the West could support the EMEs and how
East-Central Europe could and should be incorporated into the
process of European integration.
The major conclusions are that established Western market
economies have a comparative advantage in the supply of stable
and credibly institutions. The EMEs lack an appropriate internal
technology for making credible precommitments. The opportunity to
join the EC and to link their currencies irrevocably to a Western
currency (preferably the ECU) would give them an external
precommitment technology and lend credibility to the new economic
1) This point is elaborated in more detail in Schmieding (1991b).regime. With regard to the EC, an association agreement which
specifies a date for full membership would be a close substitute
for immediate accession. With respect to monetary arrangements, a
simple unilateral peg of the EME currencies to the ECU would not
suffice. Instead, the EMEs could gain considerably if they
entrusted their monetary policy to a Western central bank.
2. Conceptual Issues
In this paper, institutions are defined in a broad sense, i.e. as
encompassing not only bureaucracies and administrations but also
- and more importantly - transaction-cost reducing social devices
such as money and the entire body of laws, rules, regulations and
patterns of behaviour which constitute the non-budget constraints
under which economic agents can pursue their own individual ends.
The decisive feature is not the legal status of such a social
device but its power to shape individual behaviour, notably in
the sense of contributing to a coordination of individual
activities at low transaction costs. An essential part of an
institution in this sense is what may be called institutional
capital, namely (i) the accumulated institution-specific human
capital of both the individuals who operate an institution - say
central bankers in the case of the monetary system - and of the
individuals subject to this institution (i.a. users of the money)
and (ii) the reputation and credibility of the institutions.
Fortunately, market-conformable institutions do not have to be
re-invented or to be built from scratch in the EMEs. Such
institutions already exist in the advanced Western market
economies. The ways in which the EMEs could benefit from this
fact depend on the features of the institutional arrangement
concerned:
(1) With regard to laws, regulations and similar institutional
features that are consciously shaped by the legislative or the
executive bodies of the state, the EMEs could simply use a
Western model as a blueprint. They could even copy a model
wholesale. Naturally, this raises the problems which of thevarious arrangements of the different Western countries is best
for a developed market economy and whether these arrangements fit
the special needs of the EMEs in the transition period (see
section 7).
(2) Even public administrations and other institutions that
implement and police laws and regulations may to some extent be
imported from the West, for instance under the heading of
"technical assistance". The available supply of suitable Western
administrators and advisors who are familiar with local customs -
and the local language - may be rather limited though.
(3) The process of acquiring institutional capital in the sense
of getting acquainted with new laws and regulations can also be
facilitated by copying Western arrangements. This holds under the
assumption that economic agents can accumulate knowledge on an
institutional arrangement more easily if - as a complement to
their own current observations - they can draw on experiences
which have been gathered with the same arrangement elsewhere.
(4) In a similar vein, the adoption of an institutional
arrangement which has proven its internal consistency in the West
enhances the trust which economic agents place in the same
arrangement in an EME. A' near-certainty that an institutional
arrangement is at least internally consistent removes one of the
possible causes for doubts about whether and for how long the
institutional innovation will last in its current form. Internal
consistency does not necessarily mean that the arrangement is
appropriate for the transformation period in the EMEs or that it
conforms to other institutional arrangements that have evolved
locally or have been modelled in the image of a different Western
country. For example, a banking system of the U.S. type may not
fit with German-type capital market laws and regulations. Hence,
the probability of future institutional changes to correct such
inconsistencies is only reduced but not eliminated by opting for
some Western blueprints.Even in cases in which apparently optimal institutions might be
established by the stroke of a pen, for instance by drawing on
Western experience and creating an independent central bank
compelled by law to safeguard the internal value of the currency,
the extent to which such institutional innovations succeed in
influencing private - and government - behaviour depends on the
public perception of their credibility. Being new, such central
banks lack the anti-inflationary reputation which arises from a
history of resisting short-term incentives for loosening the
monetary reigns. Hence, the issues of institutional stability and
credibility go far beyond the considerations of internal
consistency mentioned above.
3. The Importance of Credible Institutions
Credibility problems can refer to various levels of the future
institutional environment. Economic agents may have doubts about
- the future economic order (will a market economy in fact be
introduced and maintained?),
- the future shape of individual institutions (will there be an
independent judiciary, an independent central bank...?),
- specific policies (which company law, how will the law be
applied, what will the monetary stance be...?)
On the one hand, uncertainty may arise from insufficient
knowledge about the intentions and resolve of the present
decision makers who design institutional arrangements. On the
other hand, uncertainty may stem from the possibility of a change
of decision makers. Furthermore, even in the absence of such
uncertainties, an announced policy may simply lack credibility
because it is time inconsistent or, to be more precise, subgame
imperfect. A lack of credibility causes three different kinds of
costs to individual agents and the economy as a whole, two of
which relate to uncertainty and one to genuine time
inconsistency:
(1) Because of uncertainty, the pattern of economic exchanges is
less complex than it could be otherwise. Economic agentscontinually make choices which are shaped by expectations based
on ex-ante available information. Typically, these choices cannot
be undone costlessly. Resources may have been devoted irrevocably
to certain uses, foreclosing alternative opportunities which had
been available ex ante; for reasons of transaction costs,
contracts with a time dimension may be reneged only periodically.
Hence, the reliability of the ex-ante information in general and,
more specifically, the subjective probabilities with which
economic agents expect any institutional arrangement to apply in
the future matters. The more certain economic agents are about
future institutional arrangements, the more will they be willing
to invest resources into specific uses, to conclude contracts
that are not subject to costly instant change and to engage in an
extended division of labour.
(2) To reduce uncertainty, rational economic agents will incur
costs of gathering information until the expected marginal
benefits equal the marginal costs of obtaining a further unit of
information. Besides these individual costs of what may be called
passive learning, economic agents have an incentive to find out
about the institutional arrangements by deliberately putting them
to a test (active learning). Consider the calculus of special
interest groups in a game against government. If these groups
knew for certain that the government will not dispense special
favours (sector-specific protection, subsidies) at the expense of
overall economic efficiency under any circumstances, these groups
would not waste resources to clamour for such favours. As long as
these special interest groups are not certain about the stance of
government, all of them have an incentive to test the resolve of
government to the limit. Not or not yet knowing for certain how
government will react under pressure, workers of state firms will
rationally weigh the expected probability of getting higher real
wages and of eliciting subsidies via strikes or other industrial
action against the risk that the strikes might fail and even put
some of their jobs at risk. The weaker the government and the
greater the uncertainty both about its genuine objective function
and about its resolve under pressure, the more incentive do
special interest groups have to engage in such negative-sum2 ) games.
 ; Naturally, such uncertainty is particularly pronounced
during a revolutionary transformation of the entire body politic
and economic, i.e. in the present situation of the EMEs. Weak
institutions are an invitation to pursue negative-sum games.
Those economic agents who do not join in run the risk of being
exploited by everybody else, i.e. to be the ones on whom a
disproportionate share of the overall costs is shifted.
(3) Time inconsistency causes costs in the sense that economic
agents fail to attain the social optimum. Such problems arise
when one player in a game has to move prior to another player in
a setting in which the social optimum and the Nash equilibrium
diverge. Once the first mover has irrevocably made his choice
based on the social optimum, the ex-post constraints for a
further player - for whom the social optimum is only the second
best outcome - differ from the ex-ante constraints. The second
mover can now opt for his first-best outcome at the expense of
the first mover. Anticipating such a behaviour, a rational first
mover will not aim at the social optimum in the first place but
adopt a socially undesirable defensive strategy. This leaves both
players worse off than if they had strived for the social
optimum. Take the standard example of agents who would both
benefit if one agent could extend a credit to the other one. Ex
ante, it is clearly rational for the potential borrower to
promise repayment (including interest). However, once the
borrower has got the credit (i.e. ex post) he is better off if he
does not repay. Knowing about this skewed ex-post incentive, the
potential lender will not grant the credit. The time-consistent
(subgame perfect) outcome is not optimal while the social optimum
is time-inconsistent (subgame imperfect).
2) A closely related point refers to the importance of
legitimacy; Polish citizens reacted very differently to price
increases under the old Rakowski government and under the new
legitimate Mazowiecki government.The standard solutions for inconsistency problems can be grouped
into two classes: (i) the pay-off matrix of the game is
manipulated so that the Nash equilibrium changes as to coincide
, with the social optimum in the single game under consideration,
or (ii) the one-shot game is embedded in a supergame, i.e. in a
series of similar games with the same players so that the first
mover (in the original game) can punish the second mover for
misbehaviour in further rounds. Anticipating this, the first
mover may behave in a socially optimal way from the very
beginning.
Consider the second case first. What turns a single game into a
supergame is not the mere fact of repetition. If all games were
identical, the second mover could promise to behave in each
subgame and always renege afterwards (Chari et al. 1989). The
point about repetition is the element of history contingency. The
first mover makes his action dependent on the past behaviour of
the second mover. Under conditions of uncertainty ', the
information on which the players base their decisions evolves
over the course of time. Observing the actual behaviour of others
in every round yields information about their preferences. In
other words: players establish a reputation; the longer and/or
the more clearly they have refrained from opportunistic
behaviour, the more credible is their promise to go for the
social optimum - which makes it increasingly rational for the
first mover to do so as well. If the supergame is played with an
infinite or an uncertain time horizon, if the future punishment
for opportunistic behaviour is sufficiently harsh and credible
and if the factor by which the potential opportunist discounts
future pains is sufficiently small, the second mover will choose
the social optimum strategy.
Considerations of reputation can be seen as an elegant and
flexible means to get around problems of time inconsistency.
3) More precisely: imperfect knowledge about the preferences of
other actors and the present and future states of nature.Formal models employing reputation, however, do not yield very
relevant or robust results. Many models have multiple equilibria,
depending i.a. on the lengths of the "punishments" (Rogoff 1989);
knowledge about multiple equilibria does not help economic agents
very much who have to choose one real-live strategy now. Even in
specifications with a unique equilibrium, the properties of the
solution are sensitive to the assumptions about information
(Rogoff 1989). This point is obvious: If the problem of time
inconsistency is aggravated by uncertainty about the
policymaker's objectives or about the costs which the policymaker
attaches to a loss in reputation, the other players have little
reason to base their actions on the assumption that government
and administrations (the second movers) will resist temptations
for exploitation.
Unfortunately, the very argument that players will behave because
they cherish their reputation is particularly unconvincing for
EMEs. Concern for reputation has two aspects, namely ^that___of
safeguarding an established reputation and that of acquiring a
future reputation. By definition, the new politicians and
administrators have little established reputation to draw on. And
with regard~to~a~~supposed concern for future reputation, economic
agents may assume that the time horizon of governments in the
upheavals of the transformation period is rather limited (i.e.
government is perceived to discount the future by more than would
be normal elsewhere). In a similar vein, the uncertainty about
who might replace the present actors is particularly pronounced
in the transformation period so that rational economic agents
will have a strong incentive to hedge their bets. In other words:
the reputation of the local actors in the EMEs is unlikely to
play even the limited role which it can elsewhere.
Paradoxically, a pronounced concern for future reputation may
even have adverse short-run implications if an institution needs
to convince economic agents of its true nature by deeds rather
than mere words. Consider the case of a new central bank whose
directors are genuinely committed to price stability. In order to
establish their anti-inflationary credentials, these directorswill rationally invest in reputation by adopting a monetary
stance that is more restrictive in the beginning than it would be
if the central bankers were already satisfied with their
reputation. While this increases the probability that economic
agents correctly interpret the central bankers' behaviour as
evidence of a genuine commitment to be tough on inflation, it
initially adds a further element of a money-induced recession to
the present transformation crisis. To signal their resolve in all
future crises, new central bankers may have an incentive to
engineer one immediately. This point can be generalized: The less
reputation the new institutions have, the smaller is their scope
for reacting flexibly to unforeseen challenges over the course of
the transformation process without jeopardising the credibility
and hence effectiveness of the transformation programme as a
whole.
As a close substitute for reputation, a promise to stick to the
social optimum strategy can be made more credible and hence
beneficial by changing the pay-off matrix of the potentially
opportunistic player in a single game. If a means can be found to
reduce the opportunistic gain below the reward which the second
mover gets from the social optimum strategy anyhow, he can
credibly precommit himself to the latter strategy by subjecting
himself to the punishment for opportunism (i.a. by the use of
hostages or of a collateral, see Kronman 1985 for a survey). If a
binding commitment to an ex-ante optimal policy is possible, the
incentive for the second mover to deviate ex post is immaterial.
Unfortunately, such commitment technologies are particularly hard
to find for the dealings between state institutions endowed with
sovereign rights as second movers and economic agents as first
movers (Persson 1988). Being able to shape the rules of the local
game, the sovereign state can hardly precommit itself credibly to
accept a future internal punishment for opportunistic behaviour.
And the damage which reneging would do to the reputation of the
institution may not make much of a difference (see above). Note
that, due to uncertainty on the part of the public about the true
preferences of sovereign actors, these arguments apply even if
the relevant politicians and administrators were in fact10
genuinely committed to attaining the social optimum and would
hence voluntarily want to forego any chance for opportunistic
behaviour. They simply have no appropriate precommitment
technology at their disposal, at least not within their own
country.
To sum up: the standard means for mitigating credibility problems
are only of limited use in the transformation crisis in the EMEs,
i.e. in a situation in which the need to make the nascent
institutional arrangements stable and credible is particularly
pronounced. If the new arrangements are insufficiently credible
and perceived to be unstable, they will fail to shape individual
behaviour in the desired way. This aggravates the transformation
crisis - which in turn adds to the widespread doubts about the
stability of the new institutions. The EMEs face the hazard of an
institutional circulus vitiosus.
4. Borrowing Institutional Credibility from the West
The credibility problems refer to the current situation within
the EMEs. In the ideal case, the EMEs would need
- an opportunity to draw on an established reputation,
- a technology for a credible precommitment, and
- a device for signalling the true preferences of the actors,
whom the public under imperfect information may wrongly perceive
as being susceptible to opportunistic behaviour.
While internal solutions are not readily available, the chance to
team up with established institutions of Western market economies
can provide an external solution. Remember that a simple internal
decision to copy Western blueprints does not suffice (see section
2). Even if laws, regulations and administrative bodies were
exact replicas of Western models, they would be less credible,
stable and hence beneficial than in the West. Consider the issue
in the terminology of a production problem. With an identical
technology (laws, regulations, administrative bodies) and an
identical endowment with one input factor (competent politicians
and administrators with the same preferences as their Western11
counterparts), less institutional stability and credibility can
be produced in the EMEs because these countries are less endowed
with a further input factor, namely reputation. Because of
'differential endowments, the EMEs have a comparative disadvantage
in the production of a credible and stable institutional
environment": Hence", the EMEs would stand to gain xf they could
import either the missing input factor (reputation ') or the
output (institutional stability)•5-r
These considerations presuppose that reputation is inter-
nationally jnobile and/or that institutional stability can be
supplied beyond the confines of the geographic entity in which it
has ^been produced. Consider a club whose rules demand that
members behave—in a certain way. By joining the club, members
voluntarily restrict their freedom of action. If they cannot
leave the club costlessly, their commitment to club-conformable
behaviour is hence more credible than the mere announcement of an
outsider to play by rules which are similar to those of the club.
Institutional stability and credibility is supplied externally in
the sense that the chance to join a club offers prospective
members a superior way of precommitting themselves and of
signalling their true intentions. If the EMEs can become members
4) As reputation is something that is itself "produced" over the
course of time, it would be more precise, albeit terminologically
less convenient, to think of reputation as an intermediate
product.
5) External suppliers of reputation would demand no compensation
if their was no rivalry in the use of reputation. However, as a
failure abroad is likely to impair the reputation of an
institution in its home country as well, reputation will not be
supplied across borders without a compensation. Such a
compensation need not take the form of a tradable good or
service. The greater freedom of action which the supplier of
reputation gains by his ability to shape policy not only
internally but also externally may be worth the risk. At least,
he has greater knowledge and control about external developments
which may have internal ramifications. Incidentally, this is one
of the major reasons why Western states with comparatively close
economic (or political) contacts with the EMEs are the natural
choice among potential suppliers of reputation.12
of an international club which puts comparatively sweeping
demands on its members and for which the exit costs would be
high, i.e. clubs like the European Community and/or the European
Monetary System, the incentive for time-inconsistent behaviour
and the public uncertainty about the future institutional
arrangements would be dramatically reduced in the fields that are
covered by the respective membership rules. In the extreme case,
the authority to conduct policy in a specific field is not
delegated to a common supranational body but to an institution on
which the new member (i.e. the EME) has no influence at all.
An external commitment of this kind enhances credibility if a
serious breach of the club rules (which might be punished by
expulsion) increases the likelihood that such a deed will be
noticed immediately and/or adds to the costs which policymakers
have to incur in the case of a corresponding breach of a mere
internal promise. The decision to join the club lifts the
commitment to play by the rules to the level of constitutional
choice. Joining__and—leaving, the club are highly visible acts
likely to be_jioticed by the voters. In other words: economic
agents need to incur less information_c.os.ts—to. find__o.u.t^-about—a—
major breach_of discipline - and punish the misbehaviour at the
time of the next election. Because the day-to-day policy will be
monitored (or even conducted) by a credible external body, local
economic agents need only inform themselves about the fact that
their country has become and still is a member of the
arrangement. They need not monitor the actual policy themselves
to learn about the credibility of the institution. Furthermore,
external monitoring means that a breach of discipline and hence
the club rules is particularly embarassing. Opportunistic
behaviour of local politicians and administrators would now
entail the reneging of a promise not only to domestic citizens
but also to foreign governments. This could impinge upon all
aspects of international relations of the EMEs. Perhaps most
importantly, the genuine popularity which the idea of "returning
to Europe" seems to enjoy in Central and Eastern Europe implies
that politicians and adminstrators in the EMEs will be13
particularly reluctant to break the rules of a European club to
which their country has been admitted.
Note that the probability of punishment and hence the incentive
to refrain from opportunistic behaviour is a positive function of
the frequency of further transactions with~-±he__same players. In
this respect, a multi-purpose club whose members deal frequently
with each other on a wealth of subjects is superior to a
single-issue club. Once a broad club like the European Community
which covers many policy fields has been established, it is
likely to exert a greater disciplinary pressure than, say, the
narrower GATT.
5. Non-monetary Institutional Integration; The EC Link
Given the importance of intra-European economic exchanges and the
cultural and historical proximity between Western Europe and the
EMEs, the EC is the club to which the EMEs attach the greatest
significance. The purpose of this section of the paper is to
sketch how institutional links between the EMEs and the EC could
enhance the probability that the EMEs will be able to adopt and
maintain a sufficiently liberal regime for the non-monetary
aspects of their international economic relations. The EC is
taken as a club in which an (almost completely) free internal
movement of goods and services, of capital and labour has been
achieved (or will be achieved by January 1, 1993). Furthermore,
countries are supposed to derive genuine political benefits from
EC membership so that the cohesion of the club is even greater
than pure economic considerations would suggest.
5.a. On the Logic of Liberalisation
To assess the importance of a regional club like the EC, first
consider the political economy of liberalisation in a Western14
market economy ' . The analysis is based on the premises that the
abolition of barriers to cross-border transactions creates net
benefits ' and that these benefits are widespread among the
members of society. If these assumptions hold, why then is
protectionism nevertheless flourishing in the real world?
Economists have two standard explanations. Both focus on
asymmetries in the political process transforming individual
preferences into collective policies:
First, rent-seeking interest groups can influence the outcome of
this political process through payments or equivalent favours to
established bureaucrats and politicians or to candidates seeking
office. Admittedly, in a state of what may be called "perfect
corruption", free trade would still emerge. As the gains from
liberalisation exceed the losses, a coalition of free traders
could always outbid a coalition of protectionists in the
"political market". Unfortunately, due to the free-rider problem
inherent in collective action (Olson 1965), a lobby representing
the small number of individuals who expect to gain from a
particular trade barrier is much more likely to emerge, to remain
stable, and to extract the required resources from its members
than any collective body of prospective losers, i.e. the large
number of consumers and domestic producers who would be hurt by
the intricate domestic and international repercussions of the
protectionist measure.
Second, voters fail to elect enough free marketeers. Gains from a
trade barrier tend to be concentrated on a minority of
individuals who will thus take notice and vote accordingly, while
the losses are so dispersed and unnoticeable that the majority of
those who lose will remain in a state of rational ignorance
6) The following paragraphs draw heavily on Schmieding (1988).
7) To put it somewhat technically: in the absence of transaction
costs, beneficiaries could collectively compensate losers in such
a way that, by their own standards, all individuals would end up
better off than before liberalisation.15
(Downs 1957). Due to this information cost calculus of voters,
politicians and bureaucrats in a democracy can supply protection
only to the extent that the negative effects do not surpass the
threshold level at which it becomes rational for a majority of
voters to devote time and effort to collecting information on
these costs and to vote accordingly. This points to a major
requirement for a feasible liberalisation strategy: if the gains
are perceived as being sufficiently large, the voters are likely
to back free traders. Thus a rational politician who would lose
votes____ijf he abolished just one particular barrier to
international transactions has a strong incentive to create a
link between a large number of liberalisation measures: the
broader the package proposed, the more voters will rationally
take the benefits into account.
As the log-rolling literature teaches, issue linkage is no
guarantee for a free trade majority. By supporting each other,
lobbies may form a coalition and help to enact a combination of
state interventions that benefits more than half of the voters
and severely harms the rest. The incentive to support such a
distributional coalition, however, depends critically on what the
individual voter knows about how he will be affected now and in
the future: The closer a liberalisation package comes to a
general and durable rule that international transactions shall be
free, the less certain can any potential opponent be (i) that he,
in his present position, will be a net loser, and (ii) that
sometime in the future- he might not assume a different position
and turn into a beneficiary.
The greater the uncertainty about the present and future
distributional consequences of liberalisation, the more will
rational indiyi.duals identify the. change... in their. .-..personal
fortunes with the expected per capita efficiency gains from
liberalisation. If the "veil of uncertainty" (Brennan and
Buchanan 1985) is thick enough, general rules instead of specific
outcomes will be the subject of political discussion and choice.
As the benefits from liberalisation exceed the costs,
protectionists are most unlikely to carry the day.16
Pursuing this constitutional approach means putting sweeping
demands on the willingness of voters to acquire and process
information about the overall effects of liberalisation. This may
be a realistic option in times of a general awareness that
drastic change is needed, i.e., in times of a deep crisis, or -
oddly enough - in times in which the remarkable success of a re-
cent liberalisation has drawn public attention to the issue.
Under ordinary circumstances, that is in a situation in which
voters have grown accustomed to the prevailing level of barriers
to trade and factor movements, the mere proposal of a general
rule that international transactions shall be free from state
interventions is unlikely to mobilise sufficient support to
overcome protectionist resistance.
Issue linkage may again offer a way out._.The task is to devise a
liberalisation package which, in addition to general gains,
confers clearly visible benefits to a well-defined group " of
individuals as well. The most plausible way for a politician to
achieve this_is to link the reduction of national tracle barriers
to that of other countries so that domestic exporters can expect
direct gains and "act" "as a countervailing lobby against
protectionist interest groups. Although a unilateral import
liberalisation would promote exports as well, the benefits would
be more dispersed and less certain than in the case of a
reciprocal approach.
Since the gains from mutual liberalisation depend on the scope of
the package, a global approach would obviously be best of all.
The problems, however, of finding like-minded partners, striking
a deal and devising ways of making it stick increase with the
number of countries involved (Keohane 1984). The success of a
strategy for reciprocal liberalisation depends on the present
collaboration and future reliability of foreign politicians. The
whole package deal could unravel if one participant defected,
causing adjustment costs for those agents who have already
adapted to the expected new trade regime. Hence, unless either a
hegemon or a powerful supra-national authority is able to enforce
a multilateral agreement, a liberal-minded politician may prefer17
to strive for a deal with a limited number of his country's major
trading partners, at least as a first step towards a more far-
reaching liberalisation.
So far, the analysis of the causes of protectionism and the logic
of liberalisation has been restricted to considerations of
political economy. As a supplement to this approach,
neo-institutionalists stress the history-contingency of the
pattern of protection. According to this approach, it is much
more difficult politically to remove an old privilege than to
resist granting a new one. Sectors which - for whatever reason -
have managed to elicit protection, are likely to keep their
special status (perhaps in a form which is modified over the
course of time) unless a major institutional change occurs.
5.b. The EC as a Commitment to Liberalisation
With respect to the standard determinants .of., ^protectionism
discussed above, the EMEs are almost uniquely well posed for a
sweeping liberalisation of their internal and external economic
relations.
(1) The element of history contingency is of comparatively little
importance. The very essence of the political transformation is a
revolutionary change in the previous arrangements which disposes
of many inherited claims.
(2) As the need for drastic changes is obvious, notably that for
a dramatic reduction in state interventionism, liberal-minded
politicians can get around the "rational ignorance" of voters
comparatively easily. They need not try to attract the attention
of voters to the arcane issue of changing an institutional
setting to which the public has grown accustomed. As a thorough
change in external economic policy is clearly on the agenda
anyhow, they merely need to explain the overall merits of a
liberal regime. The crisis saves information costs; it helps to
make voters aware of the issues.18
(3) In a similar vein, the uncertainty about how the individual
welfare will be affected in the medium and long run by a thorough
liberalisation of cross-border transactions is likely to be much
more pronounced during the general upheaval of the transformation
process than would be the case in an established market economy.
Hence, the EMEs are as close as one may ever get to a state in
which decisions on allocational efficiency can be taken behind a
"veil of uncertainty" about the precise distributional
consequences.
(4) Special interest groups (lobbies) play only a minor role for
the time being in the EMEs. The old elites are so discredited as
to wield little political influence;
 ; new special interest
groups are not yet capable of major collective actions as they
are still in the process of organizing themselves. Powerful
distributional coalitions of the sort which make liberalisation
such an arduous undertaking in mature Western democracies have
not yet emerged.
(5) Given the vast scope for expanding intra-European economic
exchanges, reciprocity at least with the major partner of the
EMEs, i.e. the EC, would further add considerably to the
political feasibility of a sweeping liberalisation.
This is not the end of the story, though. An immediate
liberalisation of all cross-border transactions may not be the
8) The favourite occupation of the more innovative members of the
old nomenclatura in the EMEs seems to be to turn capitalist via
"spontaneous privatisations" or other means of plundering
erstwhile state assets. Deplorable as this development may be on
distributional grounds, it at least implies that these segments
of the old elite no longer resist the systemic transformation.
They even acquire a vested interest in the emergence of a
capitalist system in which they could put their new private
wealth to good use. Although Winiecki (1991) clearly had
something different in mind when he argued for buying out the old
nomenclatura, these "spontaneous privatisations" can be seen as
such a bargain: the old nomenclatura gives up its previous
political power and receives a compensation in material wealth.19
first-best choice in sequencing a rational transformation
programme. Instead, temporary protection of at least some sectors
of the economy can be desirable in the initial phase for
political or economic reasons. Although it may be hard to predict
ex ante which sector will be threatened most, it is highly likely
that some sectors will come under such pronounced competitive
pressure as to make politicians willing to offer temporary
protection. Furthermore, because of market failures in the
transition period, notably the absence of a well-established
capital market, it may make economic sense to grant temporary
protection (or subsidies) to firms which may be viable in the
long run but which are threatened with insolvency because they
9) cannot get a sufficient amount of funds in a liquidity crisis. '
The supply of such protection would however create unwanted
precedents which would tend to undermine whatever credibility the
whole liberalisation programme has. Furthermore, temporary
provisions have a habit of turning into permanent arrangements
(this can be interpreted as a further instance of the
history-contingency of economic policy). Most importantly,
special interest groups will increasingly succeed in overcoming
their organizational problems over the course of time and turn
into lobbies which are as powerful as their Western counterparts.
Protectionist pressures are thus likely to grow stronger,
jeopardising the liberal regime which may have been introduced in
9) Even if there are convincing economic arguments for a
temporary protection along the lines of the infant-industry
argument, serious practical problems would have to be overcome.
If the protection is supposed to be sector-specific, i.e. geared
towards the sectors who suffer most from the imperfections of
i.a. the internal capital market, a way would have to be found to
identify these presently unprofitable but ultimately viable
sectors. If the protection is to take the form of a uniform (or
an almost uniform) tariff for all sectors - as has been proposed
i.a. for the Soviet Union by Dornbusch (1990) and by the IMF et
al. (1990, p. 29) - it would have to be explained why such a
general preferential treatment of the import-competing activities
at the expense of the exportables and the non-tradables sectors
creates net economic benefits.20
the early phase of the transformation process when these lobbies
were still weak.
The instability (the lack of credibility) of the new liberal
regime has at least one grave consequence. The benefits of
liberalisation do not only spring from cheaper imports and from
better conditions for selling the present quantity of exportables
abroad but also, and more importantly, from a specialisation of
production in line with the comparative advantages of the country
concerned. The more potential investors anticipate that the
liberal regime may not" be'"durable, the more reluctant will they
be to lock in resources into specific uses and the less will they
invest in the restructuring of production.
In the same vein in which a unilateral adoption of Western
institutional blueprints does not solve the credibility deficit
of the new arrangements (see section 2), a unilateral commitment
to free cross-border transactions does not suffice to make the
new regime credible - which in turn is a precondition for reaping
the benefits of such liberalisation. Ideally, the EMEs would need
- a way to turn the liberalisation progress which can be attained
now into a lasting achievement (i.e. to make a liberal regime
stable and credible) and
- the opportunity to deviate occasionally from the non-inter-
vention rule in a way which is clearly temporary, cannot turn
into permanent protection and does not cast doubt on the
credibility of the commitment to a liberal regime.
This is exactly what joining the EC would mean for the EMEs. If
the EMEs used their present scope for radical liberalisation to
subject themselves lastingly to the EC discipline on external
protection and internal subisidies, the final design of their
external economic policy would not be in serious doubt anymore -
at least__as long as the assumption holds that the EMEs would be
highly unlikely to incur the political, economic and perhaps even
psychological costs of leaving the EC once they have got in. A
treaty of accession could state that, during a transition period,
the EMEs could temporarily introduce tariffs and/or subsidies21
which go beyond the EC norm. The precommitment to fully accept
the EC discipline a few years hence lends credibility to the
announcement that these measures will actually be phased out. In
such a setting, a temporary protection is neither a deterrence of
investment nor an incentive to lastingly devote new resources to
sub-optimal uses.
While an outright accession to the EC is preferable for the EMEs
on credibility grounds, it need not be the only option. For the
EC, the admission of new members would further complicate the
already quite arduous process of internal decision-making (and of
agricultural reform). Hence, the EC may first need time to
streamline and adapt its political institutions in such a way
that a substantial enlargement does not impair the efficiency of
EC decision making. ' Well-designed agreements of association
could be a valuable intermediate step. If they are to impart
almost as much institutional credibility on the EMEs as immediate
EC membership would, such agreements would need to spell out that
the EMEs will finally be admitted to the EC and to specify a date
at which the EMEs become eligible for full membership. Such
association agreements would be a close substitute for an
immediate enlargement of the EC. Instant membership would anyhow
entail a period of transition during which special arrangements
would still apply for the 'EMEs.
The arguments presented above are essentially an application of
the general point that Western European institutions have a
comparative advantage in credibility, an advantage on which the
EMEs could dfaw^ With regard to a liberalisation of economic
transactions between the EC and the EMEs, a closely related and
theoretically interesting issue can be raised. Consider an
asymmetric liberalisation between two countries, both of which
had initially applied restrictions to their bilateral economic
exchanges. Does it matter which of the two countries unilaterally
10) The present negotiations on a political union might be a
convenient opportunity for the EC members to do so.22
lowers its barriers vis-a-vis the other one? According to
standard trade theory, it does not make a difference who reduces
the artificial transport costs (as long as it is done by a
comparable magnitude): if these costs decrease, the structure of
production will move closer to the free-trade pattern in both
countries in a similar way. ' The same welfare-enhancing
re-specialisation of production will materialize regardless of
who did the liberalisation. This symmetry vanishes if the two
countries are differently endowed with credibility. If the
high-credibility country liberalises, the pattern of production
would adapt; if the low-credibility country did the same,
investors would take the possibility of a future reversal into
account and invest less. In other words: the credible country has
a comparative advantage in liberalisation. The reduction of
barriers to international transactions of a comparable magnitude
elicits a more positive response and contributes more to a
specialisation in line with comparative advantages if it is
undertaken by a country with a credible external economic policy.
As long as a liberalisation of the EC vis-a-vis the EMEs would be
12) more credible than vice versa,
 ; any asymmetry in liberalisation
agreements between the EC and EMEs should be of the kind that the
EC reduces its barriers to bilateral exchanges in advance of the
EMEs.
11) This presupposes that the liberalising country reduces all
import barriers proportionately. The analysis abstracts from
distributional issues, including those of the distribution of the
additional gains from trade between the two countries.
12) The analysis is based on the assumption that the external
economic policy of the EME is not (yet) as credible as that of
the EC; either because the EME has not (yet) subjected itself to
the EC regime or because the EME's commitment to lastingly accept
the EC rigour is not entirely credible.23
6. Monetary Stabilisation; A Role for the ECU
6.a. The Stock and the Flow Problem of Stabilisation
Macroeconomic stabilisation is one of the major tasks of the
transformation process. It refers both to a stock problem, i.e.
the elimination of an accumulated monetary overhang in those EMEs
that have not yet "solved" the problem of this legacy by open
inflation, and to a flow problem, i.e. the prevention of a
further excess growth in the money supply.
By definition, the monetary overhang needs to be abolished by a
reduction in the real money supply (relative to real GDP). This
can be done via
- open inflation, which erodes the real value of a given nominal
quantity of money;
- a genuine currency reform, which administratively reduces the
value of monetary assets relative to flows (the most important
example being that a part of the nominal quantity of money is
: cancelled at roughly unchanged prices); or
- an asset switch, which converts liquid assets into less liquid
ones, for instance by adminstratively blocking money holdings
or by converting money into tradable vouchers for the
subsequent purchase of state property.
In terms of political feasibility, open inflation is the easiest
and a currency reform the most problematic option; the latter
(former) entails the most (least) visible form in which the state
deliberately breaches the promise to honour its obligation
13) vis-a-vis the holders of its money.
 ; In terms of the
13) In none of these options aggregate net wealth is.created or
destroyed relative to any other option. The major instant
difference is distributional: who bears which part of the burden
of the already existing monetary imbalance. In the case of open
inflation, the burden falls dispropor-tionately on those who keep
a relatively high share of their overall wealth in monetary
assets (often the low-wealth strata of society); in the case of a
currency reform, this effect can be mitigated by a
differentiation of the conversion rate; in the case of an asset
switch, the losers are those economic agents who would otherwise
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repercussions on real economic activity, a sizeable increase in
the price level is the most hazardous approach. The one-shot
adjustment of prices may nurture inflationary expectations and
ignite a continuous process of price increases which needs to be
stopped by a tough stabilisation programme. With regard to
credibility, both inflation and a currency reform may undermine
whatever confidence the public may have in the monetary
authorities. A currency reform, however, can comparatively easily
be presented as a once-and-for-all and hence credible solution;
especially if the old currency is replaced by a new one to
symbolise the break with the past. A further advantage of a
currency reform and an administrative asset switch over open
inflation is that both can be carried out immediately while the
adjustment of the price level needs time. With regard to monetary
control in the first phases of stabilisation, a combination of a
currency reform with an administrative conversion of some
monetary excess balances into either tradable privatisation
vouchers or equally tradable blocked accounts is preferable. With
the currency reform, the initial quantity of money can be set at
the desired level; thereafter, central bank purchases or sales of
vouchers or blocked accounts (perhaps in public auctions) could
serve to steer the development of monetary aggregates via an open
market policy which otherwise could be conducted only in a very
rudimentary form in the EMEs due to a lack of instruments and
14) suitable institutions. '
Once the stock problem has been solved, the flow problem is to
maintain a non-inflation balance between monetary demand and
aggregate supply. This necessitates an effective control over the
Forts. FuJ3note
have benefitted from the tax reductions (or the abandonment of
plans to increase taxes) if the state had not issued vouchers for
state property but had gained revenues from the sale of real
assets; see also Hofman and Koop (1990).
14) An external contribution to the elimination of a monetary
overhang could simply take the form of financial assistance so
that part of the overhang could be converted in foreign currency
or imported goods.25
money supply in the sense that (i) the monetary authorities can
actually determine the amount of central bank money (i.e. that
government or even firms cannot directly or indirectly supply
themselves with central bank money) and that (ii) the central
bank has at least a rough idea about the velocity of money and
the relation between the monetary base and broader monetary"
aggregates at any time in the transformation process. Because
commercial banks exist only in a rudimentary form and because the
experiences gathered under the old system are hardly relevant for
the new regime, the latter problem is particularly difficult to
solve. Hence, sticking to targets for narrow money is quite
unappropriate. Unfortunately, as an autonomous internal monetary
policy may have to be handled flexibly anyhow, it will be
particularly difficult to achieve anti-inflationary credibility
for such a seemingly volatile policy.
Even more important than the issue of an appropriate short-term
monetary policy is the need for the government to conduct a
fiscal policy that makes a monetization of any eventual debt
highly unlikely. This will only be achievable if firms by and
large have to get by without substantial state subsidies (or
implicit or explicit credit guarantees) and are thus subjected to
a hard budget constraint (to borrow a term from Kornai 1980).
6.b. Enhancing Monetary Credibility
The probability of success and the real economic costs associated
(i) with combatting an inflation which has erupted when the
discipline of the old regime broke down and (ii) with solving the
flow problem of monetary stabilisation depend on the credibility
of the new policies. Insufficient credibility of a policy of
monetary and fiscal austerity has five awkward consequences:
(1) The more workers and managers of (state) firms expect future
losses to be covered by state subsidies, the less incentive do
they have to accept the wage restraint which is needed for a
sustainable stabilisation; on the contrary, if they expect that
government will not be able to prevent a substantial rise in26
average wages and that at least some of the most unprofitable
sectors will be subsidised, they will rationally want their
sector to be among those sectors in which wage costs increase
most; the result is a negative-sum game of a competitive rush for
•^^ ——• -^—-. , . —- _—. _^
higher subsidies via higher wages.
(2) The less credible the monetary policy is, the more will
domestic and foreign sources of credit stay dry or dry up; i.e.
the more will government need either to run a balanced budget or
to finance a deficit via the central bank.
(3) Monetary instability causes a sub-optimal degree of
monetization and hence unnecessarily high transaction costs.
(4) For the same reason, real interest rates would be higher than
otherwise; risk-averse lenders would demand a premium for
macroeconomic uncertainties.
(5) The more unstable the general macroeconomic environment is
perceived to be, the less may risk-averse foreign banks (and the
nascent local ones) be willing and able to rapidly establish a
highly differentiated and sophisticated banking system; such a
delay would impair both the overall allocation of investible
resources and the efficiency of monetary policy.
Externally, the problems of monetary stabilisation relate to
currency convertibility and the exchange rate. An early
transition to convertibility at least on current account has two
advantages ':
(1) It removes the money-induced distortions in the price
structure of tradables and hence in the relative profitability of
producing goods and services that can be supplied to foreigners
(including tourists).
15) For a survey of the major issues see Portes (1991).27
(2) It puts an end to money-induced restrictions on the
competitive pressure which foreign suppliers can exert on
domestic producers.
Naturally, both the price structure of tradables and the extent
of foreign competition may still be affected strongly by
non-monetary instruments such as tariffs, import quotas,
subsidies and the like. And a "wrong" rate of exchange, while not
affecting the relative prices within the tradable goods sector,
would result in a "wrong" relative price between tradables and
non-tradables.
External monetary policy involves choices on two (or three)
issues, namely
- on the payments regime, i.e. on the extent of convertibility;
- on the exchange rate regime, i.e. on whether the exchange rate
should be fixed, adjustable or free; and, if the exchange rate
is not left free to float,
- on the exchange rate itself.
Sure enough, the issues of convertibility and the exchange rate
are interrelated. The sustainability of convertibility hinges
upon whether an exchange rate is correct or not; a chosen
exchange rate may be defended for the time being by altering the
degree of convertibility. With respect to credibility, there is a
pay-off between between a commitment to convertibility (i.e. a
commitment to a general regime) and a commitment to a certain
exchange rate (i.e. a commitment to a specific policy parameter).
In the extreme case in which the monetary authorities do not and
will not care at all about the exchange rate (free floating), the
commitment to convertibility is highly credible as - by
definition - there could be no reason to introduce payments
restrictions in order to defend a specific rate. And if the
monetary authorities would only care about maintaining the
exchange rate, they may resort to convertibility restrictions
once the credibility of their commitment to that rate is tested,
at least in the absence of very large funds for interventions in
the free market.28
The EMEs have no such funds to defend a fixed exchange rate that
is deemed to be fundamentally correct but has come under
short-term pressure. Neither do they have a reputation for
monetary stability and for toughness on the threat of wage
inflation. To be sustainable, the fixed exchange rate would need
to be so credible as a nominal anchor that the behaviour of
economic agents is changed s.o—that—the_latter do not put the—rate-
to the test by wage inflation. Given the lack of reputation and
thus credibility, the likely outcome is that nominal wage cost
cannot be hold completely in check; the resulting real
overvaluation causes unemployment and a balance-of-payments
crisis which ultimately triggers a nominal devaluation. As the
commitment to the fixed rate has not been sustained, the
credibility of the entire transformation programme suffers. This
may still turn out to be the fate of the admirably courageous
Balcerowicz programme in Poland.
Hence, a freely floating exchange rate seems to be the best means
to sustain convertibility. Unfortunately, the rate could be
highly unstable under unrestricted convertibility. Due to the
"lack of a domestic financial system, speculative private capital
flows could not - or only to a small extent - smooth impending
fluctuations in the exchange rate in the way they do between
well-established market economies. A pronounced instability of
the exchange rate, fuelled also by general political
uncertainties, could easily translate itself into instabilities
in the real economic sphere - and hence to a shortfall in
investment and a misallocation of scarce capital.
The implications of both extreme approaches are quite
unpalatable. Hence, if the EMEs are on their own, i.e. if they
have to get by with minor foreign exchange reserves and their own
low reputation, ..'a-crawling peg to a major Western currency
appears to be the least'risky foreign exchange regime. By opting
for a crawling peg, the monetary authorities would refrain from
using the exchange rate as a nominal anchor and from investing
whatever reputation they might have into a commitment to a
specific exchange rate. In order to be manageable and durable in29
the instable macroeconomic environment of the EMEs, the rate
would have to be reassessed and if necessary readjusted
frequently. Given the lack of large funds to smooth major
short-term fluctuations of the market exchange rate,
convertibi.li.ty-- initially—would have to be restricted to current
account transactions. Capital flows would have to be controlled
in order to avoid unsustainable short-term imbalances on the
foreign exchange market.
The above analysis presupposes that the EMEs have to get by with
their own resources; it applies to cases with starting conditions
of low-credibility. Once again, the opportunity to draw on
external support or even to take recourse to an external
precommitment technology changes the picture. External support
for making convertibility at a fixed exchange rate sustainable
and hence credible could take four different forms:
(1) The standard approach for Western benefactors is to grant a
convertibility fund, i.e. a line of preferential credit on which
the country in question could draw to defend the exchange rate if
it accepts some degree of supervision of its domestic economic
policies. Such a supplement to domestic exchange reserves makes
the commitment to maintain the exchange rate against short-term
speculative attacks more credible; the rate (and the chosen
degree of convertibility) become sustainable for a longer period
of time. However, the ultimately decisive question is whether the
provision of such a fund helps to exert disciplinary pressure on
domestic wage costs in the EMEs. This need not be the case. On
the contrary, economic agents may face perverse incentives. If
; there are external funds available at preferential terms,
politicians and/or economic agents do best if they make
themselves eligible for such support. In the extreme case, this
may mean that politicians rationally relax whatever control they
may have on wage costs in order to create the balance of payments
deficit necessary to take advantage of the funds. More
: realistically, it may imply that the resolve of politicians to30
resist such pressures is weakened ' - a point which workers may
take into account when they ponder the probability of obtaining
wage increases in the first place. And the foreign institutions
which are supposed to supervise the monetary and fiscal policy of
the EME are themselves in an awkward position. Having become
entangled with the EME, they may be reluctant to concede failure
- and rather opt for a continuation of support to an EME which
has not lived up to the original expectations. After all, an
international institution like any other rational bureaucracy may
relish having permanent tasks to justify its existence and
expansion (see also Vaubel 1983).
(2) An EME may import Western bankers with a conservative
reputation to run the autonomous monetary policy of its new
central bank (see also Rogoff 1985). This could help to make the
policy credible, albeit only up to a point. The exit costs for
the government, i.e. the costs which the government incurs if it
fires these central bankers, are likely to be small; the smaller
the punishment for defection, the less the gain in credibility.
Furthermore, the Western central bankers who operate—in "an
environment that differs substantially from that in the West may
not be as tough on inflation as they were under much more
convenient circumstances at home. Failure may not be very costly
to them personally in terms of their domestic reputation. They
could always claim that they were not given sufficient political
backing by the government of the EME.
(3) To overcome their lack of credibility, the new monetary
authorities in the EMEs may be designed in a way which
dramatically curtails or even completely removes their freedom of
manoeuvre. For example, an EME could opt for a currency board
solution. ' Although the EME nominally maintains its separate
16) Poland's pre-election relaxation of the monetary and fiscal
reigns in the autumn of 1990 may be a point in case.
17) Currency boards used to be the rule for colonies in colonial
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currency, the money is so tightly linked to a (preferably rather
stable) Western currency as to make it almost undistinguishable
from the latter. The_ currency board issues a legal tender and
guarantees to convert upon demand any of "TtsPcoTris, "nofes" *or~"its
other liabilities into_ the^janchor currency. ' The board has
almost no discretion in the conduct of its monetary policy; the
money supply is solely determined by the balance of payments, as
it is in any subregion of a currency area (for instance the city
of Kiel in the case of the DM area).
The board derives the credibility of its commitment to maintain
both full convertibility and the chosen rate by backing all its
liabilities to at least 100 per cent by interest-bearing foreign
exchange reserves in the anchor currency. If the reserves covered
exactly the domestic liabilities, the board could convert the
entire amount of central bank money into the anchor currency -
but it could not do so for broader money aggregates, i.e. for the
result of domestic credit creation. Hence, the board would not be
.able to fulfill one essential function of a central bank, namely
that of acting as lender of last resort under extreme duress. The
board could not counteract the contractionary effects of a run on
banks (i.e. of a collapse in domestic credit creation) by
19) increasing the amount of central bank money in circulation. ' In
order to be a reliable lender of last resort, the board would
need a permanent reserve ratio well above 100 per cent - or the
guaranteed opportunity to draw on foreign credits in case of a
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times. Today, two outstandingly successful countries of South
East Asia - Hongkong and Singapore - still have monetary regimes
which are or at least closely resemble currency boards.
Furthermore, the French Franc zone comes close to such an
arrangement. Its record of low-inflation is outstanding among
developing countries; see Toporowsky (1990) who, however,
criticizes the tight monetary and fiscal discipline to which the
Franc zone subjects its African member states.
18) Currency board solutions have been proposed by Hanke and
Walters (1990; for the former GDR) and by Steinherr (1991).
19) This seems to be the major reason why Bofinger (1991, pp.
25-26) dismisses the currency board option.32
run. Such a guarantee could well be obtainable from Western
central or even commercial banks. The supply of resources to
counteract a run on banks would enable the EME to weather such a
run without a contraction in the money supply - and hence without
a secondary recession. Once the structure of the domestic demand
for money has normalised, the currency board of the EME could
easily repay the credit. .
As long as the board operates, the government and the economic
agents in the country have no way to lastingly appropriate these
funds - in the same way as governments under the gold standard
could not lay hands on the gold reserves of foreign countries
other than by buying the gold for what it was worth. The currency
board could potentially exert the desired discipline on local
agents. It is far more credible than a simple (unilateral) peg to
a Western currency - and has the additional advantage of allowing
20) for convertibility on capital account. '
If the EMEs were to opt for a currency board, Western support
could take the form of a one-shot infusion of reserves to back
the EME currency board. In this case, a gift of money could
actually contribute remarkably to the process of erecting
reliable institutions in the EMEs. The major problem with the
currency board solution ' is that it is still a unilateral
arrangement. It could be abrogated by the EME (or by Hong Kong
for that matter) without reneging international agreements, i.e.
without giving rise to external exit costs. Although the currency
board has desirable features, it is hence not yet the optimum
from the viewpoint of institutional stability and credibility.
(4) In order to partake fully in the proven credibility of a
Western currency, the EMEs could completely surrender their
monetary autonomy to a Western central bank by de jure or at
least de facto adopting the Western currency. This could take
20) Naturally, the problem of a monetary overhang would have to
be solved before such a board is established.33
different forms. On the one hand, the Western central bank to
whose money the EME currency is to be pegged irrevocably could be
appointed as manager of a currency board for the EME. On the
other hand, the EME could simply introduce a Western currency as
its legal tender, in the way in which the U.S. dollar is the
currency of ^Panama.
The European Currency Unit would be the natural choice of an
anchor currency for the EMEs for whom the external economic ties
with Western Europe are by far the most important after the
collapse of the erstwhile Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
If the ECU is to be the currency to which the EME money is pegged
- or which is introduced outright in an EME - a common body of
the EMS central banks might have to be created immediately to
handle the task. This could imply a loss of valuable time on top
of the political obstacles to be overcome as such an arrangement
might be seen as prejudging some of those features of the future
West European currency union on which the EC governments have not
21 \ yet reached a consensus. ' However, the EMS governments might
also entrust this task to the central bank of a member country
(which need not be the Bundesbank).
The advantage of introducing a Western currency - instead of
opting for an externally managed currency board - would be that
the exit costs for the EME would be higher. Regaining autonomy
would not only imply reneging international agreements. The EME
would also have to introduce a new currency, which - as the
examples of various republics striving to leave Yugoslavia or the
Soviet Union shows - is not an easy venture. By proposing to the
EMEs an international agreement on the de jure or de facto
introduction of the ECU as the EME currency, the EC would in
effect offer the EMEs the most efficient technology for making a
21) Bofinger (1991); roughly in line with arguments made above,
Bofinger - of whose contribution the present author became aware
upon putting the finishing touches to this paper - advocates the
transfer of monetary autonomy of the EMEs to a supranational
institution.34
credible precommitment to external and internal monetary
stability, including the precommitment to full currency
convertibility. This would have various important advantages.
(1) Most fundamentally, Western Europe would lend its monetary
22) stability to the EMEs. ' For this reason, the process of
establishing a modern financial system would be much quicker and
smoother in the EMEs.
/
(2) As the anti-inflation policy would be highly credible, the
complete monetization of the economy would proceed rapidly and
real interest rates would not contain an above-average premium
for macroeconomic risks.
(3) For the same reason the EMEs would have scope for
non-inflationary budget deficits, i.e. for deficits which up to a
point would have no negative repercussions on macroeconomic
stability. In other words: the EMEs could run such deficits at
the time they need them most, namely in the social upheaval of
the transformation process. If the shift from socialism to a
market economy is sustained, it will ultimately result in a much
more efficient allocation of resources and hence in much higher
22) Note that this does not imply that the inflation rate in the
EME will be similar to the one in Western Europe. Only the prices
of tradables for which the law of one price by and large holds
will develop in parallel. A process of above-average economic
growth typically goes along with a revaluation in real terms as
the prices for non-tradables rise relative to those for
tradables. If catching-up countries are linked to countries with
less growth via a fixed nominal exchange rate, the former will by
necessity have a higher rate of inflation if price level changes
are measured by indices which include non-tradables. The
unwillingness of rapidly growing West Germany to permanently
accept a higher rate of inflation than the low-growth US was a
major reason why the Bretton-Woods system became unsustainable in
the late 1960s. In the same vein, the strength of the Spanish
peseta is presently a major strain on the EMS, although
fast-growing Spain has an above average rate of inflation. Urging
Spain to curb inflation to the EC average and to maintain the EMS
parity at the same time is hence tantamount to asking Spain not
to catch up to the richer countries of the EC.35
GDP. Debt incurred to cushion the transformation crisis could
hence easily be repaid a few years afterwards. Without ceding
monetary sovereignity, the EMEs would not be able to attract
sizeable private funds at the height of their crisis.
•
7. Lessons from the East German Counterexample
This paper has argued that the EMEs would benefit substantially
from integration with Western Europe. Unfortunately, the
experience of East Germany seems to indicate the opposite. The
very region of the former socialist camp which by courtesy of
German unification adopted wholesale the institutions and the
currency of a successful West European country was hit by the
worst case of an adjustment crisis. In terms of the stability and
credibility of its new institutional framework, East Germany is
in a different and seemingly much more advanced league than all
other countries in transformation to a market economy. Are the
arguments presented above invalid - or were special factors at
work which more than compensated for the institutional advantages
which East Germany could enjoy?
With respect to monetary stability, East Germany has fared well.
Inflation is negligible by the standards of other ex-communist
regions, the banking systiem has developed rapidly. The reasons
for the East German slump lie largely in the substantial increase
in production costs (Schmieding 1991a). Based on what is
admittedly only an imperfect yardstick - the domestic resource
costs of earning one DM in exports - the former East German mark
was worth only 23 West German pfennigs. Hence, the 1:1 conversion
rate for current payments in the currency union of July 1, 1990
caused a dramatic overvaluation of East German output. And
fuelled by political promises to quickly narrow the gap in living
standards between East and West Germany and to provide subsidies
for this purpose, East German wages have risen substantially
since the currency union. The East German case shows what may
happen in free wage bargaining between trade unions and managers36
of state-owned firms who have little personal incentive to care
for profitability.
23)
By now, wages in East Germany are roughly six times as high as
those in Czechoslovakia. The high level of labour costs renders
almost the entire tradables production in East Germany
unprofitable (Akerlof et al. 1991). Furthermore, almost all the
intricate complexities of West German laws and regulations have
been introduced in East Germany. These administrative hurdles to
flexibility and investment considerably impair the rebuilding of
the East German economy.
The East German experience points to three rather simple lessons:
(i) a gross overvaluation ought to be avoided;
(ii) a relaxation of wage controls for state-owned firms may
initiate a wage explosion, especially if workers have reason to
assume that generous subsidies will be forthcoming; and
(iii) the EMEs would be ill-advised to immediately adopt all the
complicated details of Western laws and regulations.
The last point is of considerable importance in the context of
this paper. Upon establishing formal institutional links with the
EC, the EMEs need the opportunity to opt for a considerably
simplified and liberalised version of the EC laws and
regulations, i.e. for the basic content but not necessarily for
23) The standard argument that actual or impending migration
triggered the East German wage explosion appears to be
superficial. It would imply that the dismal outcome is the result
of a well-functioning labour market - with wages reacting in a
textbook manner to an actual (or impending) decrease in labour
supply. However, if profit-maximising (or loss-minimising) firms
had granted higher wages in order to prevent the outmigration of
valuable workers, these wage increases would not have caused
unemployment. Firms would have offered higher wages only to the
extent that the wages do not exceed the marginal productivity of
the (remaining) workers. As post-CU wages are far above
productivity - apart from a few subsegments of the labour market
for people with exceptionally scarce skills - no rational firm
has an incentive to prevent its workers from going West, least of
all by offering higher wages.37
the complicated details of these arrangements. Such a solution
need not be restricted to a period of transition. Instead, it
could constitute a major step towards a lasting deregulation
within the EC.
8. On the Importance of Speed
For the EMEs, the institutional void which characterizes the
first phase of the transformation process presents a grave hazard
and a splendid opportunity at the same time. The hazard is
obvious: the length and depth of the transformation cris-is in the
EMEs depend on the rapid emergence and on the credibility and
stability of the new and market-conformable institutions. If the
transformation process founders because of the lack of firmly
entrenched institutions, the Central and East European states may
in the worst-case scenario go down the slippery road towards the
awkward political authoritarianism and the stiffling economic
interventionism which was the hallmark of major parts of Latin
America in the past decades (this spectre was raised i.a. by The
Economist 1990). The corresponding opportunity is enticing: as
the old system had shaped almost every aspect of the body politic
and the body economic, its collapse has created a situation which
may be as close to an institutional vacuum as mankind may ever
get. The spontaneous emergence and the conscious design of new
institutions thus face comparatively few restrictions. In a
similar vein, the weakness of the previous elites and of the
nascent new distributional coalitions facilitates the choice of
coherent first-best solutions.
The later strong institutional links between Western Europe and
the EMEs are created, the greater the hazard that the emerging
special interest groups in the EMEs will successfully thwart
attempts to implement efficient solutions. The sooner Western
Europe finds ways to lend institutional stability and credibility
to the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the more could
this help the EMEs to rapidly overcome their present
transformation crisis and to finally catch up with the West.38
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